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Playing Solomon: Federalism, 
Equitable Discretion, and the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction 
Elizabeth A. Rossi* and Brett Stark** 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction was drafted “to secure the prompt return of 
children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting 
State” and “to ensure that the rights of custody and of access under 
the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the 
other Contracting States.”  To that end, when a child is wrongfully 
removed from his country of habitual residence in violation of a 
valid custody order, and less than one year has elapsed since the 
date of abduction, the Convention provides a single remedy, set out 
in Article 12: return of the child “forthwith.”  Article 12 also 
provides that if more than one year has elapsed since the date of 
abduction, a child must still be returned, unless he is “now settled” 
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(the views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone); J.D., Boston 
University School of Law; M.A.L.D., The Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy, Tufts University.  Many thanks to Beau Barnes for his early 
editorial assistance. 
** Equal Justice Works Fellow, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of New 
York; J.D., Harvard Law School.  The author would like to thank Johannes 
Widmalm-Delphonse and Marie Ndiaye for their assistance.  
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in his new environment. Federal circuit courts have addressed 
whether the one-year time period in Article 12 may be tolled to 
prevent an abducting parent who successfully conceals her child 
for more than one year from benefiting from the so-called “settled 
defense.”  This Article focuses on a legal question that is 
intertwined with the equitable tolling question: whether the 
Convention or its implementing legislation grants United States 
federal or state courts equitable discretion to return a child deemed 
settled.  This Article argues that, in light of the Convention’s text 
and drafting history, principles of federalism, and the legislative 
history of the Convention’s implementing legislation, federal courts 
lack such authority entirely, and state courts possess it pursuant 
only to state family law. 
 
 “If ever there were an area in which federal courts should heed 
the admonition of Justice Holmes that ‘a page of history is worth a 
volume of logic,’ it is in the area of domestic relations.”1 
 
“[I]f children were chattel, I would take the children from Mrs. 
Yaman and give them to Mr. Yaman. But children aren’t chattel 
and the Convention doesn’t treat children as chattel. It treats 
children as human beings and recognizes that they have a strong 
interest in being reunited with the parent . . . from whom they were 
wrongfully removed. But they also have a strong interest in living 
their li[ves] where they’re settled that ought not [lightly] [] be 
disturbed.”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Linda Margherita Yaman, an American citizen, met Ozgur 
Yaman, a Turkish citizen, while Ozgur was pursuing post-
graduate studies at Wayne State University in Michigan.3  They 
married in 1997.4  By all accounts, their first years together were 
 
 
 1.  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). 
 2.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 77–78, Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 
2d 189 (D.N.H. 2013), ECF No. 165. 
 3.  See Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, 190 (D.N.H. 2013). 
 4.  Id. 
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happy ones.5  In 2004, however, after the couple moved to Turkey 
to raise their family, Linda’s mother told Linda that Linda’s 
grandmother had seen Ozgur sexually abusing the couple’s older 
daughter.6  Unable to prove or disprove the allegation, Linda 
became increasingly paranoid that her husband was molesting 
their daughter.7  She grew preoccupied with identifying signs of 
abuse and terrified that she was failing to protect her daughters.8  
Ozgur, who repeatedly denied the allegation, became frustrated 
with his wife’s accusations and her refusal to believe him over her 
mother.9  Linda’s mother “was very upset, horrified, very angry at 
[her]” for staying with Ozgur and told Linda “that [she] was a bad 
mother” for staying with “an abuser.”10 
The couple started marriage counseling and, unable to 
convince Linda that he had not sexually abused their daughter, 
Ozgur moved out of the family home.11  In February 2005, he filed 
for divorce, citing the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.12  
A Turkish family court conducted an extensive investigation into 
the abuse allegation and, in March 2006, concluded that it was 
false.13  The court granted sole custody of the children to Ozgur, 
though the girls remained in Linda’s custody while she appealed 
the decision.14  The Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed 
the custody decision on April 3, 2007, and Linda again appealed 
the decision.15 
While the divorce and custody proceedings were ongoing, 
Linda devised a plan to flee Turkey with the children.16  The girls’ 
passports were in a safe at Ozgur’s parents’ house, and Linda 
 
 5.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 20–21, 29, Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. 
Supp. 2d 189 (D.N.H. 2013), ECF No. 170.  
 6.  Id. at 24–25. 
 7.  Id. at 31. 
 8.  Id. at 31–33. 
 9.  Id. at 74. 
 10.  Id. at 47 (testimony of Linda Yaman). 
 11.  Id. at 73–74. 
 12.  See Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 191. 
 13.  Id. at 191. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 128, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 170; see Nadya Labi, The Snatchback, THE ATLANTIC (November 1, 2009), 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/11/ 
the-snatchback/307704/ (last visited January 14, 2014). 
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knew she would be unable to obtain them without revealing her 
intention to leave Turkey.17 Undeterred, she contacted Gus 
Zamora—a former United States Army Ranger and self-described 
“snatchback” professional who specializes in returning children to 
their custodial parents18—and hired him at a cost of $70,000, paid 
by her parents, to help her and her daughters get out of Turkey 
without their passports.19 
Meanwhile, on July 16, 2007, the court denied Linda’s second 
appeal, and on August 3, 2007, the Turkish Family Court entered 
its final ruling, awarding custody to Ozgur and ending the appeals 
process.20  Ozgur learned of the court’s decision on August 6,21 but 
by the time Ozgur and his lawyers attempted to implement the 
custody order, Linda and the girls were already gone. 
On August 11, Ozgur went to Linda’s house to see his 
daughters and discovered that no one was home.22 He 
immediately went to the police,23 who later issued a warrant for 
Linda’s arrest.24  Two days later, Ozgur successfully moved the 
court to issue a travel ban prohibiting the girls from leaving 
Turkey—to no avail.25 By then, Linda and the children had 
already fled Turkey overnight in a scuba diving powerboat bound 
for Greece.26  Once in Greece, Linda applied for passports for her 
daughters.27  She lied on the passport application forms, claiming 
that the girls’ passports were stolen and that her husband had 
 
 17.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 133, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 170; Transcript of Bench Trial at 105, Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 
189 (D.N.H. 2013), ECF No. 173. 
 18.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 128, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 170; see Labi, supra note 16. 
 19.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 129, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 170. 
 20.  Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 191. 
 21.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 47, Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 
189 (D.N.H. 2013), ECF No. 174. 
 22.  Id. at 50. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 59. 
 25.  Id. at 51. 
 26.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 104, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 173. 
 27.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 133, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 170; Transcript of Bench Trial at 105, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 173. 
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abandoned them.28  The embassy denied the applications.29 
With no passports for her daughters and no ability to fly to 
the United States, Linda looked for somewhere else they could 
settle temporarily.  She decided to travel to Andorra, a small30 
country that is located between Spain and France and is not a 
member of the European Union.31  Linda and her daughters took 
a boat from Greece to Italy and then drove an RV through Italy.32  
She then rented a car and drove from Italy to France.33  When she 
crossed the border into Andorra, Linda hid the children under 
pillows in the backseat of the car to avoid requests from border 
security to see the girls’ passports.34  While Linda and the girls 
were in Andorra, Dateline NBC, a television newsmagazine that 
airs investigative feature stories,35 interviewed Linda and aired 
her story on television, but the show kept her location secret.36 
They lived in Andorra for about two and a half years.  During 
this time, Ozgur continued searching for his children. He 
communicated with officials in Turkey and the United States.37  
Ozgur filed a criminal complaint with the police in Turkey.  As of 
January 2013, the date of the hearing, there was an outstanding 
warrant for Linda’s arrest in Turkey.38  Ozgur requested the help 
 
 28.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 133, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 170. 
 29.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 107, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 173.  The trial testimony does not indicate the reason for the denial. 
     30.    The CIA website describes Andorra as roughly 2.5 times the size of 
Washington, D.C.  It has a population of 85,293 people.  See Central 
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Andorra, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/an.html. 
 31.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 110, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 173. 
 32.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 137–38, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, 
ECF No. 170. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
     35.    See About the Show, Dateline NBC, http://www.nbcnews.com/ 
id/3032600/#54003247 (last visited January 21, 2014). 
 36.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 131, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 170; Dateline: On the Run (NBC television broadcast Sept. 10, 2010), 
available at http://insidedateline.nbcnews.com/_news/2010/09/10/ 
5085975-on-the-run (last visited January 14, 2014). 
 37.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 45, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 173. 
 38.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 59, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 174. 
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of Interpol, an international police organization,39 to search for his 
children, but the agency was unable to help because Ozgur did not 
have his daughters’ fingerprints.40  He searched the Internet to 
find information about Linda, her parents, and his daughters, but 
discovered addresses only in Oregon and Michigan, and soon 
learned that the girls were not there.41 
Eventually, Linda secured one-time-use passports for her 
daughters so they could enter the United States.  They arrived in 
April 2010 and later settled in New Hampshire.42  Ozgur received 
notice from the State Department when the passports were 
issued.43  He contacted a lawyer in the United States to help him 
locate his children and bring them back to Turkey.44  In late 2011 
or early 2012, Ozgur finally learned from the United States State 
Department that his daughters were in New Hampshire.45  In 
June 2012, he filed a petition pursuant to the 1980 Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction46—implemented in the United States by the 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”)47—
seeking a court order requiring his ex-wife to return the children 
to him.48  Linda opposed the petition, arguing that the girls faced 
a grave threat of harm if they were returned to Ozgur in Turkey 
and that the petition should be denied because the girls were 
settled in New Hampshire.49 
The District Court of New Hampshire conducted a three-day 
hearing in January 2013 under the Hague Convention.  The court 
found that:  (1) Linda had failed to provide clear and convincing 
 
 39.  See Overview, INTERPOL.NET, http://www.interpol.int/About- 
 INTERPOL/Overview (last visited Dec. 12, 2013). 
 40.  Id. at 58, 60. 
 41.  Id. at 62. 
 42.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 127, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 170. 
 43.  Id. at 67. 
 44.  Id. at 71. 
 45.  Id. 
     46.    The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 49 [hereinafter 
Hague Convention]. 
 47.  42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2013). 
 48.  Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 191. 
 49.  See id. 
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evidence of any abuse by Ozgur;50 (2) she had violated a Turkish 
custody order by fleeing and actively concealing the children after 
leaving Turkey;51 and (3) Ozgur had searched in good faith for his 
children.52  The court then considered Linda’s argument that the 
children were settled in New Hampshire.  Ozgur asked the court 
to equitably toll the one-year period in Article 12 of the 
Convention, which creates an exception to return when children 
are settled in their new environment. Specifically, Ozgur asked 
the court to toll the one-year period until the date on which he was 
finally able to locate his daughters.  He also argued in the 
alternative that the court should preclude Linda from raising the 
settled defense at all because she actively concealed the children, 
making it impossible for him to file his claim within the one-year 
period.  The court rejected both of these equitable arguments and 
concluded that the children were settled in the United States 
within the meaning of Article 12. 
In light of the court’s conclusion, Ozgur then asked the court 
to exercise “equitable discretion” and issue a return order for his 
children, notwithstanding the court’s finding that they were now 
settled.53  The court denied Ozgur’s request,54 concluding that 
neither the Hague Convention nor its implementing legislation 
granted federal courts the power to return a settled child.55   
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision denying Ozgur’s petition, reaffirming its ruling that the 
Convention does not permit equitable tolling, but rejecting the 
district court’s ruling that it lacked equitable discretion to return 
 
 50.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 53, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 165. 
 51.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 3–4, 68, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, 
ECF No. 173. 
 52.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 109, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 167. 
 53.  See Petitioner’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Preclude Respondent from Presenting the Affirmative Defense of 
“Settledness,” Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF No. 143. 
 54.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 81, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 165. 
 55.  Id. at 15 (concluding “that I lack equitable discretion to order the 
return of a settled child”); id. at 73 (concluding by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the children are settled in New Hampshire); id. at 80–81 (“So, 
I’m not going to order return under the Hague Convention and I’m resolving 
this case with respect to the Hague Convention claim and directing that 
judgment be entered for the respondent.”). 
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a settled child.56  Instead, the First Circuit held that “Article 12 [] 
does provide a mechanism to prevent misconduct from being 
rewarded without resort to equitable tolling,” namely, “equitable 
discretion.”57  Despite the First Circuit’s decision to reverse the 
district court on the equitable discretion issue, it affirmed the 
district court’s decision denying Ozgur’s petition because the 
district judge had also held that, even if the court had equitable 
discretion, in light of all the relevant factors, he would not exercise 
it in this case.58 
Using the Yaman case as its primary lens, this Article 
examines the text and history of the Hague Convention and 
ICARA, principles of federalism and international comity, and the 
rules of federal jurisdiction and concludes that the district court in 
the Yaman case correctly concluded that neither the Convention 
nor ICARA grants courts equitable discretion to return a settled 
child.  Part II maps the legal background of the Hague 
Convention, describing the criteria for establishing a prima facie 
case and the defenses available to rebut it.  Part III analyzes the 
text and drafting history of the Convention, as well as decisions of 
foreign courts, and argues that the Convention does not authorize 
courts to exercise equitable discretion to return a settled child.   
Part IV examines the legislative history of ICARA and 
determines that Congress implemented the Convention without 
modifying or expanding the powers provided by it.  Part V argues 
that an exercise of equitable discretion invites a proscribed 
“custody-type” decision that Congress prohibited federal courts 
from making, and also invites courts to rebalance competing 
interests that the drafters of the Convention carefully weighed in 
writing Article 12.  Part VI concludes that, though a United States 
court may order the return of a settled child, that order may be 
issued pursuant only to domestic family law and may not be 
issued pursuant to the Convention or ICARA.  In other words, in 
the American judicial system, it is only state courts—not federal 
 
 56.  Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 12–17 (1st Cir. 2013).  
 57.  Id. at 13 (quoting Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“[T]he way the provision functions renders this sort of equitable relief 
unnecessary.”). 
 58.  See Transcript of Bench Trial at 80–81, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, 
ECF No. 165.   
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courts—that  “play Solomon.”59 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE 1980 HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE 
CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 
A. The Hague Convention: An explanation of a Prima Facie Case 
and the defenses available under Articles 12, 13, and 20 
The Hague Convention60 was adopted in 1980 by the 
Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law.61  Its two main purposes were “to secure the 
prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in 
any Contracting State” and “to ensure that rights of custody and 
of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively 
respected in the other Contracting States.”62  The drafters wanted 
to address the problem of international child abductions occurring 
during domestic disputes and divorce proceedings.63  The United 
States is a Contracting State, and Congress implemented the 
Convention through ICARA.64  In 2012, there were a total of 1,143 
applications seeking the return of 1,617 children65 submitted to 
the United States Central Authority, which oversees 
 
 59.  Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 186 (1988); see 1 Kings 3:16–
28. 
 60.  The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 49 [hereinafter 
Hague Convention]. 
 61.  See Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 62.  Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 1.   
 63.  See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 8 (2010) (“The Convention was 
adopted in 1980 in response to the problem of international child abductions 
during domestic disputes.”); Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(“The primary purpose of the Hague Convention is ‘to preserve the status quo 
and to deter parents from crossing international boundaries in search of a 
more sympathetic court.’”) (quoting Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 
1400 (6th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Friedrich I]); Feder v. Evans–Feder, 63 F.3d 
217, 221 (3rd Cir .1995) (“[the Convention] is designed to restore the ‘factual’ 
status quo which is unilaterally altered when a parent abducts a child and 
aims to protect the legal custody rights of the non-abducting parent.”); Shalit 
v. Coppe, 182 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The Hague Convention . . . 
addressed the increasing problem of international child abduction in the 
context of international law while respecting rights of custody and visitation 
under national law.”). 
 64.  42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2013).  
 65.  2012 Outgoing Case Statistics, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, available 
at http://travel.state.gov/abduction/resources/resources_3860.html#statistics. 
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implementation of the Convention in the United States.66 
A parent seeking the return of a child abducted to the United 
States (the left-behind parent) may file a petition pursuant to both 
the Convention and the enforcement provisions of ICARA in either 
state or federal court.67  The left-behind parent must satisfy the 
elements of a prima facie case as set out in Article 3 of the 
Convention by proving that the child was wrongfully removed 
from the child’s habitual residence in violation of a valid custody 
order issued in a Contracting State.68  Importantly, a hearing 
conducted pursuant to the Convention “is not meant . . . to inquire 
into the merits of any custody dispute underlying the petition for 
return.”69  Instead, the sole purpose of the hearing is to determine 
in which jurisdiction the parents must settle their custody 
dispute.70  Neither ICARA nor the Convention vests judicial or 
administrative authorities with the power to resolve an 
underlying custody dispute.71  In fact, each document states 
explicitly that it does not confer such power.72  Instead, the 
Convention provides a single remedy, set out in Article 12: “the 
return of the child forthwith.”73 
The return remedy, however, is not absolute.  The Convention 
provides several defenses, each of which was intended to be 
construed “narrowly.”74  Article 13, for example, states that a 
 
 66.  Hague Convention, supra note 46, arts. 6, 7 (providing that each 
Contracting State shall establish a “Central Authority” to ensure compliance 
with the Convention). 
 67.  42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (2013).   
 68.  Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 3a; see Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 
580 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 
1064 (6th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Friedrich II]. 
 69.  Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 70.  See 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2013); Barzilay v. Barzilay, 536 F.3d 
844, 847 (8th Cir. 2008); HAGUE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 
CONVENTION LEGAL ANALYSIS, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10511 (Mar. 26, 1986) 
[hereinafter State Department Analysis]. 
 71.  42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4); Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 19. 
 72.  42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (“The Convention and this chapter empower 
courts in the United States to determine only rights under the Convention 
and not the merits of any underlying child custody claims.”); Hague 
Convention, supra note 46, art. 19 (“A decision under this Convention 
concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on 
the merits of any custody issue.”). 
 73.  Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 12. 
 74.  See e.g., Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2002) 
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court applying the Convention “is not bound to order the return of 
the child” if the person opposing return demonstrates that “there 
is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to 
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an 
intolerable situation.”75  A respondent may also argue under 
Article 13 that the left-behind parent was failing to exercise his 
custody rights at the time of removal; the left-behind parent 
consented to or acquiesced in the removal; or the child objects to 
being returned and “has attained an age and degree of maturity at 
which it is appropriate to take account of its views.”76  Article 20 
provides an additional defense, stating that “return of the child 
under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not 
be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State 
relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”77 
If more than one year has passed since the date of abduction, 
a respondent may pursue an additional defense pursuant to the 
second sentence of Article 12,78 as Linda Yaman did.79  That 
provision states that “even where the proceedings have been 
 
(“Exceptions to the general rule of expedient return . . . are to be construed 
narrowly.”); Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2009)(citing 
the Pérez-Vera Report and the State Department’s interpretation of the 
Convention infra) (“Although these exceptions or defenses are available, 
numerous interpretations of the Convention caution that courts must 
narrowly interpret the exceptions lest they swallow the rule of return.”).  In 
her report, Convention Reporter Elisa Pérez–Vera observed that “a 
systematic invocation of the said exceptions, substituting the forum chosen 
by the abductor for that of the child’s residence, would lead to the collapse of 
the whole structure of the Convention by depriving it of the spirit of mutual 
confidence which is its inspiration.”  Elisa Pérez–Vera, EXPLANATORY REPORT 
ON THE 1980 HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION CONVENTION 435, ¶ 34 (1982), 
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf [hereinafter Pérez–Vera 
Report]. Expressing similar concerns, the U.S. State Department has noted 
that, “[i]n drafting Articles 13 and 20 [of the Report], the representatives of 
countries participating in negotiations on the Convention were aware that 
any exceptions had to be drawn very narrowly lest their application 
undermine the express purposes of the Convention—to effect the prompt 
return of abducted children.”  State Department Analysis, supra note 70, at 
10509.  
 75.  Hague Convention, supra note 57, art. 13(b). 
 76.  Id. at art. 13. 
 77.  Id. at art. 20. 
 78.  Id. at art. 12. 
 79.  Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2013). 
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commenced after the expiration of the one year referred to in the 
preceding paragraph, [the judicial or administrative authority] 
shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated 
that the child is now settled in its new environment.”80  Thus, if 
more than one year has passed since the date of abduction, the 
abducting parent may argue that the child should not be returned 
because the child is “now settled” in the country to which the child 
was abducted. 
The drafters debated extensively the length of time during 
which the return remedy in Article 12 should be readily available.  
They realized that the time period would have to address a 
number of competing interests, including protecting a child’s 
interest in not being repeatedly uprooted, advancing the 
Convention’s goal of deterring child abduction and concealment, 
and enforcing valid custody orders.81  The drafters also wanted to 
ensure that hearings pursuant to the Hague Convention could be 
conducted quickly.82 
The drafters considered a number of ways to balance these 
interests.83  One proposal was to include two time periods: a 
shorter one for cases in which the child’s location was known, and 
a longer one for cases in which the child had been concealed.84  
Another proposal was to toll the beginning of the time period 
within which a child must be returned “forthwith” until the child 
was discovered or should have been discovered.85  The drafters 
were concerned, however, that a discovery rule of any sort would 
raise complicated “proof problems” that might prolong a hearing.86  
Thus, the drafters also considered a single time period and 
debated the appropriate length; they discussed a six-month time 
period,87 an eighteen-month time period,88 and a one-year time 
 
 80.  Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 12 (emphasis added). 
 81.  HCCH, Child Abduction, in ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIÈME 
SESSION 168 (1980) [hereinafter Preparatory Work]. 
 82.  Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 465. 
 83.  See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 12; Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 53–54 
(2d Cir. 2012). 
 84.  Preparatory Work, supra note 81.   
 85.  Id. at 231–32.   
 86.  See, e.g., Preparatory Work, supra note 81 at 291; Pérez-Vera Report, 
supra note 74, at 459. 
 87.  Preparatory Work, supra note 81, at 292. 
 88.  Id. at 216, 315. 
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period with a mechanism to revise the time period in light of the 
lessons learned as countries implemented the Convention over 
subsequent years.89  The drafters eventually agreed to include a 
single time period90 of one year,91 though the United States 
remained concerned that such a short period of time “may benefit 
those abductors who have the financial means and the aid of 
relatives or friends to arrange for life underground.”92 
The Article 12 settled defense was central to the outcome of 
the Yaman case.  Ozgur filed his petition in June 2012, almost five 
years after August 2007, when Linda fled with the children in 
violation of a valid Turkish custody order.93  Linda conceded that 
Ozgur had satisfied the elements of a prima facie case.94  Thus, 
the hearing focused on the defenses Linda raised, especially the 
settled defense and whether the one-year period in Article 12 may 
be tolled due to concealment.95  Ozgur also argued that, even if the 
court permitted Linda to raise the Article 12 defense and 
concluded that the girls were settled in New Hampshire, the court 
retained “equitable discretion” to return the children, and should 
exercise that discretion in this case and return the girls.96 
The concepts of equitable discretion and equitable tolling are 
closely related.  So, before addressing equitable discretion—the 
heart of this Article—it is necessary to explain the circuit split 
related to equitable tolling of the one-year period in Article 12.97 
 
 89.  Id. at 292. 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Id. at 292–93. 
 92.  Id. at 242 (proposing that Article 12 include two time periods, a one-
year time period for cases in which the child was not concealed, and a two-
year time limit for cases of concealment).  
 93.  See Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, 191 (D.N.H. 2013). 
 94.  See Transcript of Bench Trial at 3–4, 68, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 
189, ECF No. 173. 
 95.  See Transcript of Bench Trial at 2–9, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, 
ECF No. 165.  Linda also argued pursuant to Article 13 that, in light of 
Ozgur’s alleged sexual abuse of the older daughter, the girls faced a grave 
risk of harm if they were returned to Turkey.  Id.  The court concluded that 
Linda failed to prove the defense by “clear and convincing evidence.”  Id.  
This Article focuses solely on the Article 12 settled defense, though the 
authors note that Article 13 also presented contentious issues for the parties 
in the Yaman case. 
 96.  Id. at 12; Petitioner’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Preclude Respondent from Presenting the Affirmative Defense of 
“Settledness” at 15, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF No. 143. 
 97.  The Supreme Court will decide during the October 2013 term 
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B. Article 12 and the “Settled” Defense: A closer look at the circuit 
split related to equitable tolling 
The outcome of the Yaman trial hinged in significant part on 
the court’s interpretation of Article 12, specifically, whether the 
start of the one-year period within which a child must be returned 
“forthwith” could be equitably tolled to preclude an abducting 
parent who concealed her child from raising the settled defense.  
Article 12 states: 
Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in 
terms of Article 3 and . . . a period of less than one year 
has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or 
retention, the authority concerned shall order the return 
of the child forthwith . . . The judicial or administrative 
authority, even where the proceedings have commenced 
after the expiration of the period of one year[,] . . . shall 
also order the return of the child, unless it is 
demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new 
environment.98 
Five circuit courts—most recently, the First Circuit in 
Yaman—have considered whether the one-year time period set out 
in Article 12 may be equitably tolled in cases in which the 
abducting parent has concealed the child: the Fifth,99 Ninth,100 
and Eleventh101 Circuits have concluded that the Convention 
permits equitable tolling, and the First102 and Second103 Circuits 
have held that it does not.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Lozano v. Alvarez, the Second Circuit case, and will resolve the 
circuit split this term.104 
 
whether Article 12 of the Hague Convention permits equitable tolling.  See 
Lozano, 697 F.3d 41, cert granted, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (U.S. June 24, 2013) (No. 
12–820). 
 98.  Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 12. 
 99.  Dietz v. Dietz, 349 Fed. Appx. 930, 933–35 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 100.  Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 101.  Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723 (11th Cir. 2004).  
 102.  Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1,at 4 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 103.  Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 104.  See id., cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (U.S. June 24, 2013) (No. 12–
820). 
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1. Decisions by the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
Treating the one-year period in Article 12 as a statute of 
limitations, the Eleventh Circuit stated in Furnes v. Reeves “that 
equitable tolling may apply to ICARA petitions for the return of a 
child where the parent removing the child has secreted the child 
from the parent seeking return.”105  The court cited Supreme 
Court precedent on statutes of limitations, stating that “[i]t is 
hornbook law that limitations periods are customarily subject to 
equitable tolling, unless tolling would be inconsistent with the text 
of the relevant statute.”106  There were numerous deficiencies in 
the court’s analysis.  For example, it failed to address on what 
basis it concluded that the one-year period was a statute of 
limitations subject to equitable tolling,107 Article 12’s textual 
silence on equitable tolling,108 or the drafting history of the 
Convention.109 
Despite these defects, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning gained 
traction when the Ninth Circuit examined the issue and based its 
analysis largely on Furnes.110  The Ninth Circuit concluded in 
Duarte that “equitable principles may be applied to toll the one-
year period when circumstances suggest that the abducting parent 
took steps to conceal the whereabouts of the child from the parent 
seeking return and such concealment delayed the filing of the 
petition for return.”111  The court acknowledged concerns about 
uprooting a settled child notwithstanding the parent’s 
concealment112 but stated that “we must give significant 
consideration to the overarching intention of the Convention” to 
deter child abduction.113  It concluded that “awarding an 
abducting parent an affirmative defense if that parent hides the 
child . . . would not only encourage child abductions, but also 
 
 105.  362 F.3d at 723. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 52 (explaining why the one-year period in 
Article 12 is not a statute of limitations). 
 108.  See Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) (“The text of 
Article 12 does not address equitable tolling explicitly.”). 
 109.  See id; see also Lozano, 697 F.3d at 52–54. 
 110.  See Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  Id.  
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encourage hiding the child from the parent seeking return.”114  
Thus, “consistent with the purpose of the Convention to deter 
child abduction,” the Ninth Circuit permitted equitable tolling of 
the one-year period in Article 12.115  In Dietz v. Dietz, the Fifth 
Circuit also held that a court may equitably toll the one-year 
period in Article 12.116  This case, however, “adds nothing to the 
debate because it addresse[d] the issue in a summary fashion.”117 
2. Decisions by the First and Second Circuits 
The First and Second Circuits reached the opposite conclusion 
of that reached by the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.118  In 
Lozano v. Alvarez, the Second Circuit focused first on the text of 
the Convention, noting that “[n]either Article 12 of the Hague 
Convention nor its implementing legislation, ICARA, explicitly 
permit[s] or prohibit[s] tolling of the one-year period before a 
parent can raise the now settled defense.”119  The Lozano court 
next explained that the one-year period should not be treated as a 
statute of limitations because “the settled defense merely permits 
courts to consider the interests of a child who has been in a new 
environment for more than a year before ordering that child to be 
returned to her country of habitual residency,”120 in contrast to a 
statute of limitations after the expiration of which the ability to 
file is lost.  In other words, regardless of how much time has 
passed, Article 12 does not prohibit a left-behind parent from 
filing a Hague petition. 
Turning next to the drafting history of the Convention, the 
Second Circuit found support for its position in the history and 
purpose of Article 12.  The court concluded that equitable tolling 
would be inconsistent with the treaty’s purpose.121  It closely 
 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id.   
 116.  349 Fed. Appx. 930, 931 (5th Cir. 2009).    
 117.  Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189,196 (D.N.H. 2013).; see Dietz, 
349 Fed. Appx. at 933 (stating simply and without further analysis that 
“[b]oth ICARA and the Convention make no mention of equitable tolling, yet 
it is well established in caselaw that it applies.”). 
 118.  See Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2013); Lozano v. 
Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 119.  Lozano, 697 F.3d at 51. 
 120.  Id. at 52. 
 121.  Id.  
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analyzed the report by Hague Conference Reporter Elisa Pérez-
Vera, in which Pérez-Vera stated that “a concern for children’s 
‘true interests’ was the primary reason the signatory states ‘drew 
up the Convention.’”122  Based on the Pérez-Vera Report, the court 
observed that “the Convention is not intended to promote the 
return of a child to his or her country of habitual residency 
irrespective of that child’s best interests; rather, the Convention 
embodies the judgment that in most instances, a child’s welfare is 
best served by a prompt return to that country.”123  In assessing 
the drafters’ intent with respect to equitable tolling, the court 
noted the drafters’ consideration and ultimate rejection of 
alternative proposals for shorter and longer time periods, and for 
two time periods: one for cases in which the child was not 
concealed, and a second, longer time period for cases in which the 
child was concealed.124 
The Lozano court explained that the drafters explicitly 
acknowledged the problem of concealment and that they viewed a 
single, one-year time period as the “least bad” means of 
reconciling the child’s interest in stability with the goal of 
deterring child abductions.125  The Second Circuit concluded that 
“the Convention’s drafting history strongly supports [the] position 
that the one-year period in Article 12 was designed to allow courts 
to take into account a child’s interest in remaining in the country 
to which she has been abducted after a certain amount of time has 
passed.”126  Equitable tolling, the court believed, would undermine 
that purpose.127 
 
 122.  Id. (quoting Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 431, ¶¶ 23–24). 
 123.  Id. at 53 (emphasis in the original).  
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Id. at 54. 
 127.  Id.  The court also noted that permitting equitable tolling in cases of 
concealment would implicate “the inherent difficulty in having to prove the 
existence of those problems which can surround the locating of [a] child.”  Id.  
In other words, permitting equitable tolling would introduce proof problems 
related to whether, how, and for how long the abducting parent concealed the 
child, and also related to the left-behind parent’s efforts to locate the child.  
These evidentiary issues could prolong what is supposed to be a swift, 
straight-forward hearing to effectuate or deny the return of an abducted 
child.  This is, in fact, exactly what happened in the Yaman case when the 
parties introduced evidence relating to Linda’s efforts to conceal the children 
Ozgur’s efforts to locate them.  See Transcript of Bench Trial at 116-19, 
Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF No. 173; see also Transcript of Bench Trial 
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The Second Circuit next addressed the contrary decisions 
from the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.128  It explained that 
the Eleventh Circuit permitted equitable tolling for two reasons:  
first, to prevent rewarding a parent’s misconduct with an 
affirmative defense and; second, because it believed that equitable 
tolling should be read into every statute of limitations unless 
Congress stated otherwise.129  Finding both of these justifications 
for equitable tolling unpersuasive, the Second Circuit stated that 
the second argument failed because, “[u]nlike a statute of 
limitations,” which would prohibit a parent from filing a return 
petition after one year had expired, the well settled defense 
“merely permits courts to consider the interests of a child” before 
ordering the child’s return.130  The Eleventh Circuit’s first 
justification failed, the Second Circuit explained, because “the 
Convention expressly provided a mechanism other than equitable 
tolling to avoid rewarding a parent’s misconduct—[the] discretion 
to order the return of a child, even when a defense is satisfied.”131  
Thus, the availability of equitable discretion to return a settled 
child, in the Second Circuit’s view, constituted a justification for 
rejecting equitable tolling.  The court, however, did not identify 
the source of a court’s equitable discretion to return a settled child 
or elaborate on what factors a court should consider in exercising 
equitable discretion to return a settled child. 
The First Circuit’s decision in Yaman tracked the Second 
Circuit’s equitable tolling analysis, first addressing the text of the 
Convention and then turning to its drafting history, Executive 
Branch interpretations of Article 12, decisions of courts of other 
signatory nations, and other federal circuit courts’ opinions.132  
The First Circuit joined the Second Circuit in concluding that the 
 
at 3-16, 126-33, 139-40, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF No. 170; 
Transcript of Bench Trial at 53-73, 108-32, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 174.  
 128.  Id. at 55. 
 129.  Id. at 55.  
 130.  Id. at 52 (emphasis added).   
 131.  Id. (quoting Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 n.4 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“[E]ven where the grounds for one of the ‘narrow’ exceptions ha[s] been 
established, the district court is not necessarily bound to allow the child to 
remain with the abducting parent.”). 
 132.  See Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 2–16 (1st Cir. 2013). 
ROSSIANDSTARKFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2014  12:08 PM 
124 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:106 
one-year time period in Article 12 could not be equitably tolled.133  
Echoing the Second Circuit, it asserted that, “[e]ven if a child is 
found ‘now settled,’ an authority retains discretion to weigh 
against that finding of settledness considerations such as 
concealment before deciding whether to order return.”134  It 
concluded that, although the time period may not be equitably 
tolled, principles of equity come into play because the language of 
Article 12 itself provides “a mechanism”—namely, equitable 
discretion—“to prevent misconduct from being rewarded.”135  The 
First Circuit then provided a thorough explanation of its 
conclusion that courts have equitable discretion to return a settled 
child.136   
The First Circuit is the only circuit court to date to provide an 
in-depth analysis of the issues relating to equitable discretion.  As 
such, the Yaman case provides a useful framework for the next 
section of this Article, which will use the Yaman opinion as a 
starting point for explaining why, contrary to the First Circuit’s 
conclusion, both the Convention and ICARA prohibit a court from 
exercising equitable discretion to return a child deemed “settled” 
in his new environment. 
III. INTERPRETING THE HAGUE CONVENTION: WHY THE CONVENTION 
PROHIBITS COURTS FROM EXERCISING EQUITABLE DISCRETION TO 
RETURN A SETTLED CHILD 
 This section argues that the First Circuit erred in concluding 
that a court may return a settled child pursuant to Article 12 of 
the Convention. It argues that the First Circuit’s textual analysis 
reflects a misreading of the Convention’s language; that the court 
failed to properly interpret the drafting history of the Convention; 
that the court did not analyze the legislative history of ICARA and 
instead made incorrect assumptions about congressional intent; 
and, finally, that the court misapprehended the thrust of decisions 
from sister circuits and foreign courts, which do not provide as 
strong support for a finding of equitable discretion as the First 
Circuit suggested. 
 
 133.  Id. at 16.  
 134.  Id. at 13.  
 135.  Id.  
 136.  See id. at 12–22. This analysis is likely dicta, since it was not 
essential to the court’s decision.  See id. 
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A. Textual Analysis 
“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a 
statute, begins with its text.”137 Accordingly, in addressing 
whether the district court in Yaman had equitable discretion to 
return a settled child, the First Circuit started with the text of 
Article 12.138  The court found textual support for equitable 
discretion, observing that “[t]o say that an authority ‘shall’ order 
return ‘unless’ a child is ‘now settled’ is not to say that an 
authority is prohibited from ordering the child returned if 
settledness is found.”139  It acknowledged, but dismissed, the 
traditional principle of statutory construction—on which the 
district court relied—that Congress’s decision to omit a word or 
phrase from one section of a statute, but to include that same 
word or phrase in a closely related section of the same statute, 
must be deemed purposeful.140  Applying that principle, the 
district court had reasoned that, if the drafters intended to grant 
discretion to reject a properly established settled defense and 
return a child anyway, they clearly knew how to do so, as 
evidenced by express grants of discretion to reject properly proved 
defenses under Articles 13 and 20.141 
The First Circuit then directly compared the text of Article 12 
with the text of Articles 13 and 20,142 and concluded that a grant 
of discretion to refuse the return of a settled child made sense in 
the context of the Convention as a whole, stating, “[i]t is 
consistent with the Convention’s overall structure that Article 12 
leaves it within a court’s discretion whether to order the return of 
a ‘now settled’ child.”143 The court noted that the Convention 
included “express requirements to order return” that corresponded 
to the “express reservations of discretion” contained “elsewhere in 
the Convention.”144  It then argued by extension that because “the 
 
 137.  Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10 (2010) (quoting Medillín v. Texas, 
552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008)).  
 138.  Yaman, 730 F.3d at 16.  
 139.  Id.   
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 13.   
 143.  Id. at 17. 
 144.  Id. at 16–17 (“As we read them, Articles 13 and 20 contain express 
reservations of discretion to refuse to order return so as to qualify the express 
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Convention contains no express requirement to refuse to order the 
return of a child ‘now settled,’ there is no need to expressly reserve 
discretion so as to qualify any such requirement.”145 
The First Circuit’s analysis is flawed in several respects.  The 
Convention contains only one “express requirement[] to order 
return”: the return remedy expressed in sentence one of Article 12.  
That single express return requirement is qualified by defenses in 
Articles 13, 20, and 12.146   While Articles 13 and 20 contain 
discretionary language,147 Article 12 does not.148  The First 
Circuit’s explanation for why Articles 13 and 20 contain 
discretionary language, but Article 12 does not, is predicated on 
the court’s incorrect assumption that the Article 13 and 20 
defenses apply to separate return remedies.  On the contrary, the 
defenses in Articles 12, 13, and 20 all qualify the same return 
remedy: the one set out in Article 12.  Although the First Circuit is 
undoubtedly correct that “unless” does not necessarily mean “shall 
not,” it is equally true that, when compared to the clear language 
of Articles 13 and 20, the absence of a prohibition on returning a 
settled child cannot be understood as a grant of equitable 
discretion to do so.  A more straightforward reading of Article 12 
suggests that the “unless” construction was intended as a 
prohibition on returning a settled child.149 
 
requirements to order return contained elsewhere in the Convention.”). 
 145.  Id. at 17 (emphasis added).   
 146.  See Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 458 (characterizing the 
settled defense as a “condition[]” that attaches to the return remedy in Article 
12); id. at 459 (explaining that the obligation to return a child forthwith 
“disappears whenever it can be shown that ‘the child is now settled in its 
environment.’”). 
 147.  Article 13 states “the judicial or administration authority . . . is not 
bound to order the return of the child” if returning the child would expose the 
child to “a grave risk . . . [of] physical or psychological harm or otherwise 
place the child in an intolerable situation.”  Hague Convention, supra note 46, 
art. 13 (emphasis added).  The language in Article 20 is similar: it states that 
“[t]he return of the child . . . may be refused” if return would violate principles 
of “human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Id. at art. 20 (emphasis added).   
  148.     Article 12 states that, after one year, a child shall be returned unless 
“the child is now settled in new environment.”  Id. at art. 12. 
  149.     Cf. Edwards v. Monumental, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1273 (D. Kan. 
2011) (interpreting the phrase in an insurance policy, “We will not pay a 
benefit for a Loss which is caused by, results from, or contributed to by taking 
any drug, medication, narcotic, or hallucinogen, unless prescribed by a 
Physician,” to mean that an individual was precluded from recovering under 
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At least two Supreme Court Justices—preliminarily—read 
Article 12 not as a grant of equitable discretion, but as requiring a 
court to refuse to order the return of a child deemed settled.  
Justices Antonin Scalia and Elena Kagan explained their 
interpretation of the text of Article 12 during the Lozano oral 
arguments on December 11, 2013.  Both Justices indicated that 
they viewed the second sentence in Article 12 as an express 
prohibition on return when a child is deemed settled.150  Quoting 
from the Convention, Scalia stated that he assumed the phrase 
“shall order the return unless it is demonstrated that the child is 
now settled” in sentence two of Article 12 means that, if the child 
is settled, “you shall not order the return.”151  Justice Kagan 
agreed, stating that she interpreted Article 12 as follows:  “[t]he 
first clause says ‘shall’ and the second clause says ‘shall not.’”152  
She conceded that “there is an alternate reading where the first 
clause says ‘shall’ and the second clause essentially says ‘may or 
may not at your discretion,’” but noted that such an interpretation 
“would open up a big discretionary hole.”153  The best reading of 
Article 12 is as a prohibition on the return of a settled child.  Even 
assuming the text is ambiguous, however, the Convention’s 
drafting history contravenes the First Circuit’s interpretation. 
B. The Convention’s Drafting History 
When the text of a treaty is ambiguous, a court is entitled to 
invoke traditional rules of statutory construction.154  It “may look 
 
the plan for harm caused by substances taken “without the advice of a 
physician” but  not for harm caused by “the taking of a substance under the 
advi[c]e of a physician”); Hovila v. Tween Brands, Inc., 2010 WL 1433417 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2010) (unpublished) (stating that the “common definition 
of ‘unless’” required the court to conclude that the two categories following 
the word “unless” in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act “describe 
exceptions to the general rule requiring prior express consent before placing 
an artificial or prerecorded call.”).  
 150.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 37–38, Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov 
/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-820_5368.pdf. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 38. 
 154.  E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991) (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
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beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the 
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the 
parties” to determine the meaning of the treaty.155  An 
examination of the drafting history of the Convention 
demonstrates that the Convention prohibits courts and other 
adjudicating authorities from exercising equitable discretion to 
return a settled child. 
1. Analysis of Articles 12 and 18 
The drafting history of Articles 12 and 18 supports the 
conclusion that there is no residual discretion to return a settled 
child under Article 12.  The Convention’s primary objective is to 
serve the best interests of the child,156 and the drafters believed 
emphatically that, in the usual case, enforcement of a foreign 
custody order and deterrence of child abduction are in a child’s 
best interest.157  At the same time, the drafters did not want the 
Convention to become a vehicle for reexamining a foreign court’s 
determination of a child’s best interests.158  As the Convention 
 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  See id. at 172 (“Above all, it is obvious that the efforts made by the 
Hague Conference with a view to combat the international abduction of 
children are inspired by a desire to protect the interests of such children.”). 
 157.  Id. (“Now, among the most objective aspects of that general interest 
of the child, there is the right not to be removed or retained in the name of a 
more or less questionable right over his person.”)(empahasis added).  
 158.  See, e.g., Summary of findings on a Questionnaire studied by 
International Social Service, Preliminary Document No 3 of February 1979” 
[ISS Summary], in Preparatory Work, supra note 81, at 182 (noting that 
though many countries apply the legal standard of “the best interests of the 
child” in making custody decisions, “it has appeared . . . that ‘the best 
interests of the child’ are valued differently in the various cultures.  In some 
countries the religious education plays an important part . . . Furthermore, it 
is not clear whether the ‘interests’ of the child to be served are those of the 
immediate aftermath of the decision, of the adolescence of the child, of young 
adulthood, maturity, senescence or old age!”); Report of the Special 
Commission by Elisa Pérez-Vera, in Preparatory Work, supra note 81, at 178 
(“As to the import of the return which is favoured by the Convention, we 
should point out that it does not settle, or seek to settle, the question of 
custodial rights.”); Report of the Special Commission by Elisa Pérez-Vera, in 
Preparatory Work, supra note 81, at 182 (“[T]he domestic jurisdictions have 
often in the past granted the custody in litigation to the person who has 
unlawfully removed or retained the child, and this in the name of the child’s 
interest. Often too, this decision seemed the best one to take, but we cannot 
ignore the fact that when internal authorities think in such a way they run 
the risk of expressing a particularism, be it cultural, social or other, of a 
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Reporter explained, the “best interests of the child” standard is so 
vague that it “resemble[s] more closely a sociological paradigm 
than a concrete juridical standard.”159  Aware that making a 
custody determination in the best interests of the child would 
require a court to “delv[e] into the assumptions concerning the 
ultimate interests of a child which are derived from the moral 
framework of a particular culture,”160 the drafters included a 
provision in the treaty explicitly forbidding a state from deciding 
the merits of a custody decision until a petition for return has 
been denied.161  A decision pursuant to the Convention, therefore, 
does not constitute a decision on the merits of a custody dispute. 
Nothing in Article 12 or 18 undercuts the drafters’ intention 
to proscribe signatories from addressing the merits of a custody 
dispute pursuant to the Convention.  Pérez-Vera noted that the 
decision on the appropriate time period in Article 12 “during 
which the authorities concerned must order the return of the child 
forthwith”162 was important because, to the extent that the return 
of an abducted child is presumed to be in the child’s best interest, 
“it is clear that after a child has become settled in its new 
environment, its return should take place only after an 
examination of the merits of the custody rights exercised over it—
something which is outside the scope of the Convention.”163  
Pérez-Vera stated in her report that Articles 12 and 18 together 
address the “[d]uty to return the child” and “can be examined 
together since they complement each other.”164  According to 
Pérez-Vera, Article 12 “highlights two cases”:  (1) the duty to 
return where a petition has been filed within one year of 
abduction; and (2) “the conditions which attach to this duty where 
an application is submitted after the aforementioned time-
limit.”165  
 
certain national community, thus, really, making a very subjective judgment 
on the other national community from which the child has been pulled.”). 
  159.     Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 431, ¶ 21. 
 160.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 161.  Hague Convention, supra note 46, at art. 16.  ICARA also forbids a 
United States court from determining the merits of any underlying custody 
dispute.  See 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (2013). 
 162.  Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 458, ¶ 107 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 458, ¶ 106. 
 165.  Id. 
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Rather than contradict the Convention’s prohibition on merits 
decisions, Article 18 supports it.  It states, “[t]he provisions of this 
Chapter do not limit the power of a judicial or administrative 
authority to order the return of the child at any time,”166 and is 
simply a reminder that signatories may apply their own domestic 
laws to reevaluate the merits of a custody dispute after finding 
that a child is settled.  Some drafters felt that Article 18 was 
unnecessary; they thought it obvious that the Convention did not 
prevent states from applying their own domestic law. They 
considered eliminating it, noting that “there is always, even in the 
absence of a convention, the possibility of prescribing the child’s 
return, after the affair has been examined on its merits.”167  In 
discussing Article 18, Pérez-Vera noted specifically that provisions 
of domestic law may be invoked “particularly in the situations 
envisaged in the second paragraph of article 12” where the return 
order is refused because the child is settled in its new 
environment.168  Importantly, the United States’ delegate the 
conference understood Article 18 “as a facultative provision,”169 
intended only to make clear that the remedies provided by the 
Convention were not exclusive. 
Article 18, thus, did not confer the power to return a child 
after the expiration of the one-year time period in Article 12.170  
Nor did it leave a “residual power in judges after the expiration of 
the time-limits in Article [12].”171 It “merely implied [that 
authorities] could use whatever proceedings or powers they 
possessed in domestic law,”172 especially in cases where a child 
had been deemed “settled.”173  Article 18 “underlines the non-
exhaustive and complementary nature of the Convention” and 
“authorizes the competent authorities to order the return of the 
child by invoking other provisions more favourable to the 
attainment of this end.”174  Those “other provisions,” must be 
 
 166.  Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 18. 
 167.  Preparatory Work, supra note 81, at 202,  ¶ 92. 
 168.  Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 460, ¶ 112. 
 169.  Preparatory Work, supra note 81, at 295.  
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id.  
  173.     Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 460, ¶ 112. 
 174.  Id.  The text of ICARA reinforces this understanding. ICARA states: 
“Remedies under the Convention [are] not exclusive. The remedies 
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found—if at all—in domestic law and not in the text of the 
Convention.  When read in the context of the Convention’s 
drafting history, it is clear that neither Article 12 nor Article 18 
supports the conclusion that a court has equitable discretion 
pursuant to the Convention to return a settled child.  Articles 13 
and 20 reinforce this conclusion. 
2. Analysis of Articles 13 and 20 
The drafting history of Articles 13 and 20 further illustrates 
that Article 12 does not grant a court equitable discretion to 
return a settled child.  Just as the Pérez-Vera report considered 
Articles 12 and 18 together,175 it also considered Articles 13 and 
20 together, captioning the section discussing them:  “[p]ossible 
exceptions to the return of the child.”176  This organization 
suggests that the drafters understood the Article 12 settled 
defense as different in kind from the defenses available under 
Articles 13 and 20, though they all provided exceptions to the 
same return remedy.  Pérez-Vera noted that “the exceptions in 
these two articles do not apply automatically, in that they do not 
invariably result in the child’s retention.”177  Rather, “the very 
nature of these exceptions gives judges a discretion—and does not 
impose upon them a duty—to refuse to return a child in certain 
circumstances.”178 Perez-Vera made no similar observation 
regarding the settled defense in Article 12. 
In the context of the Convention drafters’ goals and concerns, 
it makes sense that the drafters granted authorities discretion to 
return a child in the face of a successful Article 13 or 20 defense, 
but not after a determination that a child is settled; these defenses 
serve different purposes.  The defenses available in Articles 13 
and 20, and the discretion granted to a court to reject them, reflect 
the “fragile compromise[s] reached during the deliberations of the 
Special Commission.”179  As to Article 13, it “was not intended to 
 
established by the Convention and this chapter shall be in addition to 
remedies available under other laws or international agreements.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(h) (2013). 
 175.  Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 460 ¶ 106 
  176      Id. at 460 para. 3. 
 177.  Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 460, ¶ 113. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 460, ¶ 116. 
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be used by defendants as a vehicle to litigate (or relitigate) the 
child’s best interests.”180  To that end, “[o]nly evidence directly 
establishing the existence of a grave risk that would expose the 
child to physical or emotional harm or otherwise place the child in 
an intolerable situation is material to the court’s 
determination.”181  The child’s interest in return to his habitual 
residence gives way only when return would expose the child to 
“physical or psychological danger” or “an intolerable situation.”182 
Article 13, in other words, is not a back-door to a merits hearing 
on custody rights. 
Similarly, the Article 20 defense is to be narrowly construed.  
It is available only when “the fundamental principles of the 
requested State . . . do not permit” return.183  “[I]t will not be 
sufficient to show merely that its return would be incompatible, 
even manifestly incompatible, with these principles.”184  Rather, 
for return to be rejected under Article 20, return must be 
prohibited by the requested states’ internal law.185  This provision 
“was the result of a compromise between those delegates which 
favoured, and those which were opposed to, the inclusion of a 
‘public policy’ clause.”186  These defenses threatened to render the 
Convention a “dead letter”187 because they implicated judgments 
about foreign countries’ political, cultural, and religious traditions.  
The drafters accordingly intended them to be narrowly construed; 
hence, they incorporated grants of discretion to reject a successful 
defense under either Article.188 
 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 74, at 433, ¶ 30.  
 183.  Id. at 461–62, ¶ 118. 
 184.  Id.  
 185.  Id.  
[E]ven if its literal meaning is strongly reminiscent of the 
terminology used in international texts concerning the protection of 
human rights, this particular rule is not directed at developments 
which have occurred on the international level, but is concerned only 
with the principles accepted by the law of the requested state, either 
through general international and treaty law, or through internal 
legislation.  
   Id. 
 186.  Id. at 433–34, ¶ 31.  
 187.  Id. at 434–35, ¶ 34. 
 188.  See State Department Analysis, supra note 70, at 10510. 
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Article 12, by contrast, does not similarly implicate political or 
cultural judgments.  Rather, it allows for a basically objective 
examination of a child’s status as settled, or not, in his new 
environment.189  It permits examination of a child’s life in the 
country to which the child was abducted and allows a court to 
determine whether the child would be better off—because he is 
settled where he is—remaining in that country while the parents 
dispute their custody rights, rather than being forcibly returned to 
the country from which he was abducted, only to face a heightened 
possibility of being subsequently returned to the country to which 
he was abducted and where he is “now settled.”  The Article 12 
settled defense and the one-year time period reflect the fact that 
the Convention’s overarching goal was to protect a child’s best 
interests, and that the drafters viewed returning a settled child as 
tantamount to treating the child as a “yo-yo.”190 
The foregoing discussion of the drafting histories of Articles 
12, 18, 13, and 20 demonstrates that the discretion available to 
return a child in the face of a viable Article 13 or Article 20 
defense is unavailable under Article 12, and that Article 18 does 
not represent a grant of equitable discretion to return a settled 
child.  A determination of settledness neither requires an 
assessment of the child’s ultimate best interests nor invites 
judgment regarding another signatory’s social and cultural values; 
it simply permits the court to examine the child’s degree of 
acclimation to her new environment, and if the child is deemed 
settled, requires the parties to litigate their custody dispute in the 
 
 189.  See, e.g., Lozano v. Alvarez, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“Among the factors that courts have considered in determining whether or 
not a child has become settled are: ‘the age of the child[;] the stability of the 
child's residence in the new environment[;] whether the child attends school 
or day care consistently[;] whether the child attends church [or other 
religious institutions] regularly[;] the stability of the mother's employment[;] 
and whether the child has friends and relatives in the new area.’”) (quoting 
In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)); In re Filipczak, 513 Fed. 
Appx. 16, 19 (2d Cir. Feb. 27 2013) (stating that the Article 12 settledness 
standard “does not call for determining in which location the child is 
relatively better settled, but rather for determining whether the child has 
become so settled in a new environment that repatriation would be against 
the child’s best interest”). 
 190.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Lozano, 697 F.3d 41, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-
820_5368.pdf. 
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country where the child presently resides. 
C. Decisions from sister circuits and foreign courts 
1. Sister circuits 
Both the First and Second Circuits purported to find support 
for equitable discretion in decisions by sister circuits.191  For 
example, the First Circuit stated that “[w]hile no other circuit has 
addressed the ‘now settled’ defense in particular,” “[o]ther circuits 
agree that the Convention confers upon a federal district court the 
authority to order return even if a party establishes a ‘now settled’ 
defense.”192  Notwithstanding the fact that these two statements 
are contradictory, neither the First nor the Second Circuit 
identified cases that are actually relevant to the question of 
whether courts possess equitable discretion pursuant to Article 12, 
as opposed to Articles 13 and 20.  In fact, all of the cases that the 
First and Second Circuit cite trace back to the State Department’s 
legal analysis of Articles 13 and 20, and not Article 12. As already 
discussed, Articles 13 and 20, unlike Article 12, contain 
discretionary language by their own terms. 
The Second Circuit, for example, found support for its finding 
of equitable discretion in Blondin v. Dubois, another Second 
Circuit decision.  Blondin, however, involved the Article 13 grave 
risk defense.193  In that case, the court stated that “[e]ven where 
the grounds for one of the ‘narrow’ exceptions ha[s] been 
established, the district court is not necessarily bound to allow the 
child to remain with the abducting parent.”194  The Blondin panel 
in turn supported its statement with a Sixth Circuit case, 
Friedrich v. Friedrich, which stated in the context of the Article 13 
 
 191.  Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 55 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Blondin v. 
Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 n.4 (2d Cir. 1999) (addressing the Article 13 grave 
risk defense)); Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing 
Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 1995) (addressing an Article 
13 defense); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1067 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(addressing the discretion available to a court when a party raises an Article 
13 or 20 defense); and Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(addressing Article 13)). 
 192.  Yaman, 730 F.3d at 20 (“Numerous circuits accept the general 
proposition that ‘courts retain the discretion to order return even if one of the 
[Convention’s] exceptions is proven.”). 
 193.  189 F.3d at 246 n.4. 
 194.   Id. 
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and 20 defenses that “a federal court retains, and should use when 
appropriate, the discretion to return a child, despite the existence 
of a defense, if return would further the aims of the 
Convention.”195  
The Friedrich court rooted its claim to discretion in a Third 
Circuit case, Feder v. Evans-Feder,196 in which the Third Circuit 
stated that “courts retain the discretion to order return even if one 
of the exceptions is proven.”197 Feder, however, also implicated an 
Article 13 defense—and not the Article 12 well-settled defense.198 
The Feder court properly cited the Federal Register for support, 
which states that “a finding that one or more of the exceptions 
provided by Articles 13 and 20 are applicable does not make 
refusal of a return order mandatory.  The courts retain the 
discretion to order the child returned even if they consider that 
one or more of the exceptions applies.”199 While this analysis is 
undoubtedly true of those two articles, it says nothing about any 
equitable power that might exist under Article 12 to return a 
settled child. Instead of demonstrating why any equitable powers 
might exist under Article 12, these cases merely affirm the 
existence of discretionary authority pursuant to Articles 13 and 
20.  After tracing the Lozano and Yaman courts’ citation trails 
back to their origins, it is clear that no circuit court opinion can 
carry the weight the First and Second Circuits ask it to bear. 
2. Foreign courts 
The opinions of sister signatories are “entitled to great 
weight,”200 especially where, as here, Congress has expressly 
affirmed the value of uniform treaty interpretation in the text of 
the implementing legislation.201  Foreign court decisions regarding 
equitable discretion to return a settled child pursuant to the 
 
 195.  Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1067 (citing Feder 63 F.3d at 226).   
 196.  63 F.3d at 226. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  See id. at 221 (noting that the respondent argued her child faced a 
“grave risk” of “physical or psychological harm” and an “intolerable situation” 
if returned to Australia).  The First Circuit cited to Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 
392, 402 (4th Cir. 2001), which relied on Feder in discussing Article 13.  See 
also Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 199.  State Department Analysis, supra note 70, at 10509. 
 200.  Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 67 (2010). 
 201.  42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B) (2013). 
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Convention point in both directions.  The Yaman court found 
support in decisions by the Court of Appeals for England and 
Wales, the Supreme Court of Ireland, and an analysis by the 
British House of Lords in In re M.202  The First Circuit, however, 
failed to acknowledge the persuasive limits of these cases and 
ignored decisions from foreign courts that reached the opposite 
conclusion. 
For example, while the British House of Lords in In re M 
ultimately agreed that the Convention does grant equitable 
discretion to return a settled child,  the majority reached its 
conclusion “not without considerable hesitation.” 203  One judge 
dissented, stating that “once a child has become settled, precisely 
because the purpose of the Convention to promote speedy return 
can no longer be achieved, the Convention ceases to play a role.  
Then, as article 18 envisages, the court is to have resort to its 
powers outside the Convention.”204  The In re M majority 
acknowledged this point, stating that “[i]n settlement cases . . . 
the major objective of the Convention cannot be achieved. . . .  It 
cannot any longer be assumed that that country is the better 
forum for the resolution of the parental dispute.”205  Even after 
concluding that it had discretion to return a settled child, 
however, the House of Lords declined to exercise it, stating that 
“the policy of the Convention can carry little weight”206 against 
“powerful child-centric considerations.”207  Because of the father’s 
delay in filing a Hague petition, the Convention’s “primary 
objective cannot be fulfilled,” and “[t]hese children should not be 
made to suffer for the sake of general deterrence of the evil of 
child abduction world wide.”208 
The First Circuit cited a case from the Supreme Court of 
Ireland, in which that court “arrived at a similar conclusion” and 
inferred a grant of discretion from Article 18.209  The Irish court, 
 
 202.  Yaman, 730 F.3d at 20. 
 203.  See In re M, [2007] UKHL 55, A.C. (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.), 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt 
/jd071205/inrem%20-1.htm.  
 204.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
 205.  Id. at ¶ 47. 
 206.  Id. at ¶ 54. 
 207.  Id. at ¶ 53. 
 208.  Id. at ¶ 54. 
 209.  Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing P. v. 
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however, did not undertake an in-depth analysis of the equitable 
discretion issue and merely stated in a conclusory fashion that 
“this Court has a discretion as to whether to order [the child’s] 
return to Spain.”210 
Further weakening the First Circuit’s efforts to rely on 
support from the courts of other signatories are decisions from at 
least three foreign courts that have held that the Convention does 
not grant discretion to return a settled child.  For example, an 
Australian court has stated: 
[W]hile there is some suggestion in some English cases 
that a finding of “settled in a new environment” still 
leaves a discretion in the court to order the return of a 
child, I must respectfully disagree with those views. If 
those views are simply saying that by operation of 
common law or local statute law, as distinct from Hague 
Convention law, the court has jurisdiction to order the 
return of a child, then there is no dispute between myself 
and the other learned judges. If, however, it is suggested 
that within the four walls of the Hague Convention there 
is room for discretion in respect of a child who has met 
the criteria of being more than one year away from the 
wrongful retention or removal and now settled in its new 
environment, then in my view there is no such room.211 
The court continued by analyzing the function of Article 18: 
Art[icle] 18 does no more than indicate that the 
Convention makes up part of the law of a country 
exercising Convention powers and that it does not seek to 
codify the entire law relating to dealings with children 
about whom it is argued there are jurisdictional questions 
or about whom it is argued their welfare requires them to 
be taken to another country.  In my view, if I concluded 
 
B., [1999] 4 I.R. 185; [1999] 2 I.L.R.M. 401(Ir.), available at http:// 
www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0391.htm).  
 210.  P. v. B., [1999] 4 I.R. 185; [1999] 2 I.L.R.M. 401(Ir.), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0391.htm. 
 211.  State Central Authority v. Ayob, [1997] 21 Fam LR 567 (Austl.), 
available at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0232.htm. The Australian 
court confirmed this view in 2005. See FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA ANNUAL 
REPORT 2005–2006 81, available at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/wcm/ 
resources/file/eb52a50eee4dced/Part_5_Significant_Judgments_AR06.pdf. 
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that this was a Hague child who had been wrongfully 
removed or retained, and that more than one year had 
passed prior to application being made, and I was 
satisfied the child was settled in her new environment, 
that would be the end of the matter under the Hague 
Convention and under the Regulations.212 
Courts in Hong Kong213 and Canada214 also have concluded 
that they lack discretion under the Convention to return a settled 
child.  Although New Zealand courts have concluded that they do 
have discretion to return a settled child, that power arises under 
the Care of Children Act of 2004—which implemented the 
Convention in New Zealand—and expressly provides for such 
discretion.215  Thus, at the very least, the First Circuit in Yaman 
overstated the extent to which decisions from foreign courts 
support its conclusion. 
Because the Convention itself did not authorize states parties 
to return a settled child, a court may take such action only if it 
otherwise has the power to do so, for example, if its domestic 
implementing legislation permits it—as in New Zealand.216  Thus, 
the next question this Article addresses is whether ICARA, the 
Convention’s implementing legislation in the United States, 
granted courts in the United States jurisdiction to return a settled 
child. 
 
IV. ICARA DOES NOT EXPAND THE JURISDICTIONAL GRANT IN THE 
HAGUE CONVENTION. 
The First Circuit argued that it did.  It stated that a court’s 
“power to order the return of a settled child” stems from “federal 
 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  See Summary of A.C. v. P.C., Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, INCADAT, available at http://www.incadat. 
com/index.cfm?act=search.detail&cid=825&lng=1&sl=1.  
 214.  See Droit de la Famille 2785, No. 500-09-005532-973, [1995] 
INCADAT 653, (Can. Q.C.C.A.), available at http://www.incadat.com/ 
index.cfm?act=search.detail&cid=653&lng=1&sl=2.  
 215.  See Care of Child Act 2004 § 106(1)(a) (N.Z.) (“[T]he court may refuse 
to make an order . . . for the return of the child if . . . the child is now settled 
in his or her new environment . . . ”). 
 216.  See id. 
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courts’ broad equitable powers”217 and the federal government’s 
traditional role in “decisions bearing on foreign relations.”218  The 
court asserted that ICARA—though not the Convention itself—
grants federal courts the power to return an abducted child, so 
that the court “assume[d]” that, in granting federal courts that 
power, Congress necessarily intended for federal courts “to bring 
their full toolkit to the assignment.”219 It acknowledged the 
district court’s position that “a parent seeking the return of a 
settled child must go to state court (or convince a federal court to 
exercise pendant jurisdiction),” but expressed “doubt[] that 
Congress intended for this traditional separation of authority to 
apply in cases of international child abduction, which are matters 
not just of family law but also of international relations.”220  The 
court, however, did not include any analysis of the legislative 
history of ICARA, which makes it clear that the jurisdictional 
grant in ICARA is coextensive with the powers conferred by the 
Convention and did not grant United States courts additional 
power to return a settled child. 
An understanding of core principles of federal jurisdiction, 
including especially the so-called “domestic relations exception,” is 
necessary to accurately assess the powers granted by the Hague 
Convention and ICARA.  Federal courts derive their power to hear 
and decide cases from both the Constitution and Congress.221  
Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution states that the federal 
judicial power lies in “one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish,”222 and reflects the “Madisonian Compromise”—which 
is “the standard view that the Constitution does not require 
Congress to create or to vest jurisdiction in any federal court 
except the Supreme Court.”223  Article III, Section 2 establishes 
the outer limit of federal court jurisdiction.224  Congress thus has 
 
 217.  Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d  1, 17 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 218.  Id. at 18.  
 219.  Id. at 17. 
  220.     Id. at 18. 
  221.     Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 442 (1850). 
 222.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 223.  Lumen N. Mulligan, Did the Madisonian Compromise Survive 
Detention at Guantanamo?, 85 N.Y.U.L. REV. 535, 535 (2010). 
 224.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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plenary power to determine the scope of the federal courts’ subject 
matter jurisdiction225  within the parameters of Article III, Section 
2.226 
Under these principles, “[b]oth the Constitution and an act of 
Congress must concur in conferring power upon the Circuit 
Courts,”227 and Congress may withhold jurisdiction over matters 
“in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem 
proper for the public good.”228  Relevant here is the Constitution’s 
grant of jurisdiction to cases “arising under . . . treaties”229 such as 
the Hague Convention, and the jurisdictional grant in ICARA, 
which provided both state and federal courts with “concurrent 
original jurisdiction of actions arising under the Convention,”230 
and “empower[ed]” them “to determine only rights under the 
Convention and not the merits of any underlying child custody 
claims.”231 
The domestic relations exception is a principle of federal court 
jurisdiction, which states that “[t]he whole subject of the domestic 
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the 
laws of the States and not to the laws of United States.”232  The 
domestic relations exception is not rooted in the Constitution.233  
Instead, it is a “construction of the diversity statute.”234  Pursuant 
 
 225.  Dating back at least to 1850, it has been black-letter law that the 
contingent nature of the lower federal courts implies the power to limit their 
jurisdiction.  See Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 446. 
 226.  Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695 (1992) (stating that 
Article III “delineates the absolute limits on federal courts’ jurisdiction.”). 
 227.  Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 442. 
 228.  Id. (holding “the courts cannot exercise jurisdiction in every case to 
which the judicial power extends, without the intervention of Congress, who 
are not bound to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to every 
subject which the Constitution might warrant.”). 
 229.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 230.  42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2013). 
 231.  42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2013). 
 232.  Ex Parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–594 (1890); Ankenbrandt, 504 
U.S. at 694-95 (holding that the domestic relations exception divests federal 
courts of authority to hear custody disputes). 
 233.  Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 695 (“An examination of Article III, Barber 
itself, and our cases since Barber makes clear that the Constitution does not 
exclude domestic relations cases from the jurisdiction otherwise granted by 
statute to the federal courts.”). 
 234.  Id. at 700–01 (noting that “where Congress made substantive 
changes to the [diversity] statute in other respects . . . we presume, absent 
any indication that Congress intended to alter this exception . . . that 
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to it, Congress “divest[ed] the federal courts of power to issue 
divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”235  The rule is 
“supported by sound policy considerations,”236 as state courts have 
developed substantial expertise in divorce, alimony, and child 
custody decisions over time.237   
Congress was acutely aware of the challenges associated with 
drafting implementing legislation for an international treaty that 
dealt with domestic relations and child custody issues.238  In 
considering whether to grant federal courts original concurrent 
jurisdiction of Hague cases, Congress recognized the unique 
challenges posed by the United States’ federalist system and 
debated how best to keep family law matters out of federal court. 
Specifically, it considered whether federal courts should have 
original concurrent jurisdiction to hear Hague cases.  The House 
of Representatives proposed a version of the law that permitted 
only state courts to hear Hague Convention cases.  Supporters of 
this version looked to the domestic relations exception for support.  
Kevin R. Jones, representing the Department of Justice, testified 
 
Congress ‘adopt[ed] that interpretation’ when it reenacted the diversity 
statute.”). 
 235.  Id. at 703 (stating that “[g]iven the long passage of time without any 
expression of congressional dissatisfaction” the court reaffirmed the 
exception). 
 236.  Id. at 704 (holding that the domestic relations exception divests 
federal courts of authority to hear custody disputes). 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Congress has applied the domestic relations exception in drafting 
other federal statutes.  For example, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status 
(“SIJS”) is an immigration benefit available to youth under twenty-one years 
of age who have been “abused, abandoned, and neglected” by one or both of 
their parents.  INA § 101(a)(27)(J); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 
204.11(c) (2011).  Though it is “[u]nquestionably” true that federal authority 
over immigration is “plenary and exclusive,” Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 26 
(1982), in order for a child to become eligible for SIJS, he “must first seek a 
predicate or special findings order from a state court.”  Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 1 (January 2011) (emphasis 
added).  The Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) presented similar 
issues.  See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE'S 1991 YEAR-END REPORT 
ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (1992) (lamenting that VAWA “would 
unnecessarily expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts” and “could involve 
the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations disputes.”).  In light of 
these concerns, VAWA was drafted to “protect state prerogatives and the 
federal docket.”  Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family 
Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1315 (1998). 
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that granting federal courts any role at all in ICARA cases would 
violate the domestic relations exception and that jurisdiction 
should be withheld for that reason.  He drew an analogy to the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (“PKPA”), arguing 
that although legal issues arising under ICARA originate in 
federal law, the substance of the issues is quintessentially family 
law, and therefore Hague cases should remain in state courts.239 
The legislative debate also included discussion of Thompson v. 
Thompson, a Supreme Court case decided the same year that 
ICARA was enacted.240  In Thompson, the Court was asked to 
decide whether PKPA granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
PKPA cases. The Court concluded that federal courts lacked 
jurisdiction to hear disputes under PKPA for two central reasons: 
first, because the legislative history indicated that Congress had 
considered and ultimately rejected a jurisdictional grant to federal 
courts; and, second, because PKPA cases involved domestic 
relations matters and should therefore be reserved for more 
experienced state courts.241  “Instructing the federal courts to play 
Solomon,” the Court wrote, “would entangle them in traditional 
state law questions that they have little expertise to resolve.”242  
Recognizing the domestic relations exception, the Court stated 
that even preliminary decisions on jurisdiction made by federal 
courts under PKPA could “involve the federal courts in 
substantive domestic relations determinations,” since jurisdiction 
can turn on “the child’s ‘best interest’ or on proof that the child 
has been abandoned or abused.”243 
Such considerations applied with equal force to ICARA, 
according to the DOJ. “Just as with PKPA,” Jones maintained, 
disputes arising under ICARA would “require courts to consider 
 
 239.  A Bill to Facilitate Implementation of the 1980 Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, and for Other Purposes:  
Hearing on S. 1347 before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 74 (1988) (Responses to Written 
Questions submitted by the Subcommittee, Thomas Boyd, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General of the United States) [hereinafter Hearing before the S. 
Subcommittee].  
 240.  See 484 U.S. 174 (1988). 
 241.  Id. at 174, 175–76. 
 242.  Id. at 186. 
 243.  Id. at 176–77. 
ROSSIANDSTARKFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2014  12:08 PM 
2014] PLAYING SOLOMON 143 
traditional domestic relations inquiries.”244  Pointing to the settled 
exception in Article 12 of the Convention, Jones argued that such 
“fact specific” issues would “turn on the circumstances of the 
child,” which only state courts should address.245  Just because the 
legal standards are codified in an international convention, Jones 
argued, “does not change the fact that the principles expressed in 
them are akin to traditional domestic relations matters.”246 
Jones also contended that state courts were more competent 
than federal courts to hear ICARA cases because they have 
traditionally had concurrent jurisdiction over cases arising under 
international treaties and are accustomed to interpreting and 
applying international law and to adjudicating questions of family 
law.247 Moreover, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Enforcement Act248 already empowered states to interpret and 
enforce foreign custody orders.249 
 
 244.  Hearing before the S. Subcommittee, supra note 239, at 60 
(statement of Kevin R. Jones, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Legal 
Policy, Department of Justice). 
 245.  Id. at 61. 
 246.  Id.  
 247.  Id. at 74 (citing Responses to Written Questions submitted by the 
Subcommittee, Thomas Boyd, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the 
United States)  
. . . until 1980, jurisdiction in the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 was limited to cases involving a jurisdictional minimum 
amount.  Thus, until 1980, even if a claim arose under a treaty or 
other federal law, but involved less than $10,000, the claim would be 
resolved in state court . . . [e]ven today, where a case involves a 
federal issue . . . but the cause of cause of action does not ‘arise 
under’ a federal law or treaty . . . such federal law issues are 
routinely encountered and resolved in the state courts. 
  Id.  
 248.  See generally Applicability and Application of Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to International Child 
Custody and Support Actions, 66 A.L.R. 269 (6th ed. 2011) (explaining that 
the UCCJEA, adopted by forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, 
“establishes the exclusive basis for jurisdiction over a child custody matter” 
and that “[f]oreign child custody or protection orders are now frequently 
recognized and enforced under the doctrine of comity, with state courts 
considering foreign countries as if they were states of the United States for 
jurisdictional purposes under the UCCJEA”); see also Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Uniform Law Commission,  
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Child%20Custody%20Jurisdiction
%20and%20Enforcement%20Act. 
 249.  Hearing before the S. Subcommittee, supra note 239, at 74.  
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Commenting on the House version of the law, Senator Byrd 
observed, “The reason that the House constructed this approach 
was out of concern that these cases would embroil the Federal 
courts in deciding child custody matters.  I must say that I 
understand this concern . . . [N]one of the proponents of this 
bill . . . want[s] to see the Federal courts [] involved in deciding the 
underlying custody disputes.”250  Byrd argued, however, that, 
although Hague Convention cases involve “an underlying concern 
of child custody,”251 because those cases would arise under an 
international treaty, parties would inevitably seek removal to 
federal court, thereby embroiling the parties in protracted 
litigation that would unnecessarily prolong what was meant to be 
a quick and efficient hearing.252  Byrd therefore introduced an 
alternative version of the law that granted concurrent original 
jurisdiction to federal courts and was intended to forestall 
protracted litigation over jurisdictional issues that could delay 
resolution of Hague cases.253 
Co-chairman of the Child Custody Committee of the Family 
Law Section of the American Bar Association, Patricia M. Hoff, 
also testified.  She argued for concurrent state and federal 
jurisdiction and sought to diminish the relevance of the domestic 
relations exception.  “Federal judges,” she argued, “have 
successfully adjudicated the tort claims stemming from parental 
kidnapping without becoming enmeshed in the merits of the 
underlying custody dispute.”254  They are equally able, she argued, 
to handle international abduction cases without becoming marred 
in child custody issues.  Moreover, cases involving citizens of 
different countries implicated a heightened need for federal court 
 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Procedures to Implement the Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, 134 CONG. REC. S3839, 3839-40 (daily ed. Apr. 
12, 1988). 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  See id. (Senator Dixon advocated for “clear language on this sensitive 
matter of jurisdiction,” clarity necessary to avoid “an endless series of 
litigation” on the availability of federal forums in Hague Convention cases). 
 254.  International Child Abduction Act:  Hearing on H.R. 2673 and H.R. 
3971 before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 65 (1988) (testimony of Patricia M. 
Hoff, Co-Chairman, Child Custody Committee of the Family Law Section, 
American Bar Association) [hereinafter Hearing Before the H.R. 
Subcommittee]. 
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jurisdiction that could neutralize “the spectre of local bias.”255  
Ultimately, Congress voted to grant both state and federal courts 
original concurrent jurisdiction,256 concluding that it made sense 
to grant state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction to avoid 
litigation over jurisdictional questions in light of the fact that, 
under ICARA, “the issues of treaty interpretation and child 
custody are inseparably combined.”257 
Congress, however, still wanted to ensure that the language 
of the proposed implementing legislation sufficiently cabined child 
custody issues.258  For example, Senator Hatch sought to identify 
the specific “custody-related questions that may arise in the 
context of disputes under the Hague Convention.”259  He listed 
five situations involving “traditional[] custody-related matters 
handled by the States” that would arise under the Convention.260  
Those matters were: 
[W]hether or not a child has settled into its new 
environment, whether or not there is a grave risk that 
return of a child would expose him or her to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an 
intolerable situation, whether or not the parent from 
whom the child was taken was exercising rights of 
custody or had acquiesced in the removal of the child, 
whether or not the child has attained the age and degree 
of maturity at which it is appropriate [to] take account of 
its views, and whether or not any custody determinations 
have been rendered in the count[r]y receiving the request 
for the child’s return.261 
Senator Dixon confirmed that this list constituted “the extent 
of custody-type issues permitted under the Hague Convention.”262 
 
 255.  International Child Abduction Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
100th Cong. 66 (1998) (statement of Patricia M. Hoff, Co-Chairman, Child 
Custody Comm. of the Family Law Section, American Bar Association). 
 256.  134 CONG. REC. 6482. 
 257.  Id. at 6484. 
 258.  See id. at 6482–84. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Id.  
 261.  Id. 
 262.  Id.  
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Thus, to the extent an outcome of a Hague case would require a 
“custody-type” decision other than those listed above, ICARA was 
presumed to prohibit it.  An exercise of equitable discretion to 
return a settled child is outside the scope of those decisions which 
Congress authorized the federal courts to consider. 
V. EXERCISING EQUITABLE DISCRETION CONTRAVENES THE DRAFTERS’ 
AND CONGRESS’ INTENT 
A.  Equitable Discretion invites a prohibited “custody-type” 
inquiry 
In practice, the exercise of equitable discretion, even when 
“not [] free-wheeling,”263 encroaches on areas of family law outside 
of the limits set by ICARA and the Convention. The Yaman and 
Lozano cases provide apt examples of why returning a settled 
child provokes litigation that mirrors in substance the merits of a 
custody decision—even if it does not result in a comprehensive 
custody hearing—and involves federal courts in domestic relations 
matters outside of what either the Convention or ICARA 
authorizes. 
In Yaman, Ozgur argued that equitable discretion was 
appropriate given Linda’s “poor judgment” and its negative impact 
on the girls.264  Under his view, any “proper analysis” of whether 
to exercise equitable discretion required consideration of “the 
interests of the children and their ability to thrive in a stable 
environment.”265  These factors are the same types of factors that 
a family court considers when deciding child custody disputes, and 
are alien to cases under the Convention and ICARA.266  For 
example, New Hampshire courts consider “[t]he conduct of the 
parties” and “the ability of the parents to promote the welfare of 
the children”267 in making custody decisions.  Ozgur’s argument is 
an apt illustration of the Pandora’s Box of domestic relations 
 
 263.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Lozano, 697 F.3d 41 (statement 
of Assistant Solicitor General), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov 
/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-820_5368.pdf. 
 264.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 79, Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF 
No. 165. 
 265.  Brief for the Appellant at 67, Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2013), Document No. 00116536505. 
 266.  See Del Pozzo v. Del Pozzo, 309 A.2d 151, 152 (N.H. 1973). 
 267.  Id. at 153. 
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issues that is opened through the exercise of equitable discretion.  
It impermissibly invites federal courts to consider factors that 
Congress explicitly sought to exclude from ICARA cases and that 
the domestic relations exception removes from federal jurisdiction.  
The First Circuit’s contention that it possesses equitable 
discretion under the Convention and ICARA is belied by the 
practical implications of its exercise.268 
B. Equitable Discretion impermissibly requires courts to ignore 
the drafters’ carefully negotiated compromises  
In Lozano, the Solicitor General attempted to identify the 
factors that a court may consider when applying equitable 
discretion.269  She argued that if a child is deemed settled, there is 
no obligation to return the child, but that the court must instead 
conduct an inquiry that is “guided by the objectives of the 
treaty.”270  This open-ended standard, she claimed, should reflect 
the fact that the Convention “is really geared in the first place 
toward preventing abduction.”271   
This view contravenes the drafters’ intent because it invites 
courts to rebalance the objectives that the Convention drafters 
carefully weighed when drafting Article 12 and, especially, the 
one-year time period in which return “forthwith” is the prescribed 
remedy.  As described above, the Convention’s drafters concluded 
that, after a year, if a child is settled, the child should not be 
uprooted, either for the sake of preventing abductions272 or for any 
 
 268.  Additionally, neither court acknowledged the fact that these 
considerations are the same ones that will inevitably be litigated during the 
actual custody hearing.  Raising them in the context of a Hague petition 
contravenes the intent of the drafters and Congress to ensure that a Hague 
proceeding is quick, efficient, and narrow, and that it does not morph into a 
custody hearing by another name.   
 269.  See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae, Lozano v. Alvarez, No. 12-
820, 2013 WL 2280948, at *11–15 (U.S. May 24, 2013). 
 270.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Lozano, 697 F.3d 41 available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-
820_5368.pdf. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Although “there might in theory be some general deterrent effect 
against clever abductors if they know that they couldn’t claim the benefit of 
settledness if they concealed the location of the child,” the deterrent effect is 
speculative and likely to be limited.  Transcript of Bench Trial at 79-80, 
Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 189, ECF No. 165. 
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other reason.  To do otherwise, as the district court stated in its 
bench ruling in Yaman, “would be to treat children like chattel, 
which they aren’t.”273  The drafters decided that the child’s well-
being, once the child is settled and a year has passed, must not be 
compromised, notwithstanding the Convention’s objective to deter 
child abductions. As explained above, the drafting history 
demonstrates that the drafters knew they were drawing a line 
that represented the “least bad”274 solution to the problem of 
competing interests, specifically, a child’s interest in not being 
repeatedly uprooted—treated like a “yo-yo”275—and  the drafters’ 
goal of deterring child abductions and concealment.  To recast the 
Convention as being “really geared in the first place toward 
preventing abduction”276 is to rewrite and undo the priorities 
agreed upon by the drafters. The Lozano case illustrates that 
exercising equitable discretion to return a settled child invites a 
court to reevaluate policy questions that the drafters already 
considered and decided.277 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE RETURN OF A SETTLED CHILD MAY BE ORDERED 
PURSUANT ONLY TO DOMESTIC FAMILY LAW. 
The Article 12 settled defense, including the one-year period 
set out therein, reflects a careful balancing of the drafters’ 
interests in international comity and deterrence of child 
abduction, and a child’s interest in settlement.  The Convention’s 
 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41,  51 (2d Cir. 2012).  
 275.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Lozano, 697 F.3d 41 (statement 
by Justice Breyer), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-820_5368.pdf. 
 276.  Id. at 46 (argument by Assistant Solicitor General Ann O’Connell). 
 277.  The Yaman case likewise illustrates this point.  On appeal, Ozgur 
urged the court to consider [f]our main sets of interest implicated by the 
Convention:  
1) The interest in returning a child to her country of habitual 
residence and maintaining jurisdiction for child custody 
determinations there; 2) the interest in deterring child abductions; 3) 
the interest in affording the left-behind parent a remedy for the 
abduction[; and 4) the interests of the children and their ability to 
thrive in a stable environment].  
Brief for the Appellant at 67, Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, Document No. 
00116536505. The drafters, however, already weighed these interests when 
they established the one-year time period in Article 12.   
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drafters concluded that, after a year, if a child is settled, a court 
may not order the child’s return.  They believed that a child’s well-
being, if he is settled and a year has passed, must not be 
compromised as punishment for the abducting parent’s conduct, 
even if that means that the abducting parent benefits from 
abducting and concealing the child by having the ability to litigate 
the custody dispute in his or her home court.  The First Circuit 
conceded in the Yaman case that the district court’s concern that 
ordering the return of a settled child “would be in effect [to] 
rebalanc[e] competing public policy concerns that were already 
balanced by the drafters of the Convention,”278  would be valid if 
the language of Article 12 were mandatory.279  As argued in this 
Article, however, Article’s 12’s prohibition on returning a settled 
child is mandatory.  Following a determination of settledness, a 
child should not bear the brunt of a punishment aimed at 
deterring his parent and other would-be abductors. 
The text and drafting histories of the Convention and ICARA 
make clear that neither one authorizes a court to exercise 
equitable discretion to return a child deemed settled, and that 
such a grant would contravene several of the Convention’s key 
policy concerns, as well as the domestic relations exception and 
the congressional record.  When deciding Hague cases, federal 
courts are not entitled to wield all of the equitable tools in their 
“toolkit,”280 and if the return of a settled child is to occur, it must 
take place, if at all, pursuant to domestic law.  As Article 18 
makes clear, domestic courts may exercise any power they 
otherwise have to return an abducted child.281  This article 
 
 278.  Yaman, 730 F.3d at 16 n.15. 
 279.  Id.  
 280.  Id. at 17. 
 281.  This is, in fact, what Ozgur Yaman did.  He successfully secured a 
return order from a New Hampshire state court pursuant to the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act.  See Notice of Decision, In the 
Matter of Ismail Yaman and Linda Yaman, ECF No. 195-1.  The New 
Hampshire court issued that decision without examining the merits of the 
custody decision.  The authors of this article believe there may be preemption 
issues related to the New Hampshire court’s decision to enforce the Turkish 
custody order under New Hampshire state law in the face of the federal 
district court’s refusal to return the children under federal law.  Cf. In re 
T.L.B., 272 P.3d 1148, 1155 (Co. App. Ct. Jan. 19, 2012).   Analysis of this 
issue, however, is outside the scope of this article.  
  Additionally, whether the district court could have exercised 
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envisions a narrowly circumscribed role for federal courts 
adjudicating child abduction cases under the Hague Convention, a 
view that comports with the drafters’ belief and Congress’ 
acknowledgment that children must be treated as people, not 
property, and that no court should use the return of a child as a 
means of punishing a wrongdoing parent.  Thus, in the United 
States—where Hague cases implicate principles of federalism, 
family law, and international law—state courts retain sole custody 
over the decision to return a settled child. 
 
 
 
 
supplemental jurisdiction over Ozgur’s state law cause of action (brought 
under the UCCJEA) is another important question that is outside the scope 
of this Article.  The domestic relations exception is an exception to both 
diversity jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction.  As explained in this 
article, Congress granted federal courts concurrent original jurisdiction over 
Hague cases in order to avoid provoking litigation that might arise if a 
litigant sought to remove a case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction.  
Nothing in the statute, however specifically addresses whether federal courts 
may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims. Compare 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 
(codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)).  It is clear, however, 
that Congress intended to preclude federal courts from adjudicating any 
custody-related question other than those that were specifically set out in the 
Convention.  In light of ICARA’s legislative history, Congress likely intended 
to preclude federal courts from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over 
claims the adjudication of which would contravene the domestic relations 
exception.  It therefore would be inconsistent with ICARA for a litigant to use 
supplemental jurisdiction as a means of circumventing the express language 
in ICARA prohibiting courts from adjudicating custody disputes pursuant to 
it.  
